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LET US PRAY: 
THE CASE FOR LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Nicholas J. Hunt 
The annals of American history paint the picture of a government influenced by 
religion. The Founders of this nation believed in the nonpreferential treatment of religion, 
which entailed rigid neutrality amongst the various denominations but did not eliminate 
religion from the public square. For the last sixty years, the Supreme Court’s capacious 
reading of the Establishment Clause brought a great divide between religion and 
government. Case-by-case and brick-by-brick, courts continue to raise Thomas Jefferson’s 
metaphorical wall of separation between church and state. 
This faulty interpretation of the Establishment Clause led to the current split 
between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits over legislator-led prayer. The split correlates with 
the Supreme Court’s failure to set an interpretive standard for the lower courts to follow 
on the issue. Now, judicial declarations of opposition to legislator-led prayer threaten to 
halt a tradition that has echoed through the chambers of legislatures and town halls since 
the founding of the United States. 
This paper proposes that there is a constitutional analog between legislative prayer 
and legislator-led prayer. I argue that antiquated Establishment Clause tests such as 
“Lemon,” “Endorsement,” and “Psychological Coercion,” bear no constitutional footing 
in evaluating legislator-led prayer. Rather, the Court should look to a test that connects 
with the historical underpinnings of the First Amendment and reflects the original 
meaning of the Establishment Clause regarding government prayer. The evaluation 
includes: 1) a look to the history and tradition of legislator-led prayer in this country; and 
2) an actual legal coercion standard, which is congruent with the original meaning of the 
establishment of a religion. This historically accurate inquiry proves that legislator-led 
prayer invokes a tradition intricately embedded in the fabric of this nation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Let us pray.” This is a not an uncommon phrase in American culture. Many people 
would expect to hear it while attending church services or other religious events. Likewise, 
it was not an uncommon phrase during the events surrounding the birth of America. The 
historical record proves the profound religious convictions possessed by founders of our 
nation and the framers of our Constitution. This phrase rings loudly through the corridors 
of our history, voiced by honorable and devout men as they assumed the mantle of nation 
builders. It is a phrase uttered in haloed tones by the courageous military leaders of the 
Revolutionary War, men like George Washington who stole away to offer prayers in 
supplication for Divine intervention. Our forefathers offered these words of supplication 
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to a Divine Being—whose blessings and guidance they sought—as they engaged in writing 
the United States Constitution. Five weeks into the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin 
Franklin stood and reminded the attendees of how many times they prayed together in the 
past: 
In the beginning of the Contest with Great Britain, when we were sensible of danger we had 
daily prayer in this room for the divine protection. Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were 
graciously answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed 
frequent instances of a superintending providence in our favor.1 
In present day, these words of invitation and prayer uttered by government officials 
set off waves of litigation by those who object to legislator-led prayer at public meetings 
on the basis that it violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.2 The appearance 
of such cases birthed a renewed judicial embrace of the history surrounding the 
development of the Clause. Twentieth Century jurisprudence has had a discombobulated 
approach to the history and interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
This murky historical interpretation by the Supreme Court is directly responsible for the 
current judicial disagreement on the topic of legislator-led prayer between the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits. 
This paper examines the history surrounding the framing of the First Amendment 
and the history of legislator-led prayer. It proposes that the Fourth and Sixth Circuit split 
provides the Supreme Court with the perfect opportunity to clarify the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause and affirm the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer. 
Part II of this paper gives a comprehensive overview of the history surrounding the 
debates and drafting of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This section 
delves into the actions of the Founders and Framers and sheds light on the truth that our 
government was never intended to be devoid of religious influence. It ends with a 
discussion of how the misinterpretation of a metaphor caused half a century of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to be mired in confusion. Part III examines the inner 
turmoil of the Supreme Court, which led to a plethora of conflicting tests used to evaluate 
alleged Establishment Clause violations. Part IV gives a summary of Supreme Court cases 
that shaped Establishment Clause jurisprudence and legislative prayer and the ambiguity 
the cases have left the lower courts to interpret. Part V discusses the circuit split between 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits on legislator-led prayer. It analyzes how the two circuits use 
the same Supreme Court case to draw two polar-opposite conclusions on the issue. Part VI 
proposes that the Supreme Court should rely on history through a two-part evaluation of 
whether legislator-led prayer violates the Establishment Clause. The test 1) looks to the 
history and tradition of legislator-led prayer, and 2) evaluates fact-specific inquiries under 
an actual legal coercion test. By adopting this approach, the Court can find that legislator-
led prayer holds a constitutional analog to legislative-prayer, thus making the practice per 
se constitutional. 
                                                          
 1. MARK A. BELILES & DOUGLAS S. ANDERSON, CONTENDING FOR THE CONSTITUTION, RECALLING THE 
CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE ON THE WRITING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BIBLICAL BASIS OF AMERICAN LAW 
AND LIBERTY 27 (2005). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”). 
3
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II. MISTAKEN HISTORY AND A MYTHICAL WALL 
A. Let History Decide 
Seventy-one years ago, the Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 
encapsulated its explanation of the Establishment Clause firmly within the parameters of 
Thomas Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation,” which he described in his Letter to the 
Danbury Baptist Association.3 Reynolds v. U.S. was the only authority cited in Everson as 
direct precedent for the “wall of separation between Church and State theory” laid down 
by the Court.4 And almost forty years after Everson, Justice Rehnquist wrote a blistering 
dissent. 
The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. As 
drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today. Any 
deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will only lead 
to the type of unprincipled decision making that has plagued our Establishment Clause 
cases since Everson.5 
Existing historical documents and testimonies paint a compelling portrait of Framers 
who “intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as the 
‘national’ one, and designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference 
for one religious denomination or sect over others.”6 The abundance of First Amendment 
historical record does not contain one piece of evidence indicative of the Framers’ intent 
to abolish religion from government by constructing an inviolable wall between the two, 
prohibiting Congress from using nondiscriminatory sectarian means to accomplish 
legitimate nonreligious ends.7 The Court’s reliance on Jefferson’s metaphor shrouded 
future Establishment Clause cases in a dismal judicial mist, which served the purpose of 
obstructing and preventing a pure historical interpretation of the First Amendment. 
B. The Framers’ Debate 
Throughout the arduous and heated debates over ratification of the Constitution, the 
gentlemen opposing it were doing so on the basis that a Constitution should have clearly 
defined individual freedoms. Without these established rights, the Framers saw potential 
for a tyrannical government emerging and ruling the new nation.8 James Madison 
championed the defense that it would be impossible for the Federal Government to violate 
individual freedoms because it would only possess limited delegated powers.9 By 1789, 
eleven colonies ratified the Constitution, five of which had already suggested individual 
freedom amendments.10 New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia included declarations 
                                                          
 3. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 4. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 n.1 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Reynolds is the only 
authority cited as direct precedent for the ‘wall of separation theory.’ Reynolds is truly inapt; it dealt with a 
Mormon’s Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy law.”). 
 5. Id. at 113 (citations omitted). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 92–93. 
 9. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93. 
 10. Id. 
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of religious freedom, while ratification failed in Rhode Island and North Carolina, due to 
the lack of individual freedom amendments.11 
Figuratively, historical myth might paint a picture of a zealous James Madison 
mounted on a white steed and riding into a ratification battle carrying the banner of the 
Bill of Rights, as if the fight for their inclusion in the Constitution was a mountain upon 
which he was willing to die. However, this could not be further from fact. Madison 
staunchly believed that the Bill of Rights was not necessary and referred to the entire 
ratification process as the “nauseous project of amendments.”12 A large group of 
supporters joined him in the House of Representatives, describing the Bill of Rights as 
“milk and water amendments,” “bread pills,” and “a little flourish and dressing.”13 
The Anti-Federalists’ strong rhetoric against the Constitution appeared to be solely 
due to the Constitution’s lack of language guaranteeing the personal religious freedoms of 
the individual, but their objections were to the commerce regulation and taxation powers 
of Congress rather than the lack of religious freedom guarantees.14 Many scholars think 
the complaints about the absence of personal religious liberties written into the 
Constitution, and the proposal of amendments to remedy this omission, were designed to 
create a smokescreen to disguise the true economic motive of forcing changes limiting 
Congress’s commerce regulation and taxation powers.15 
Nevertheless, on June 8, 1789, James Madison took the floor of the House of 
Representatives and brought forth the promised list of Amendments.16 
It appears to me that this House is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first 
session pass over without proposing to the State Legislatures, some things to be incorporated 
into the Constitution, that will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United 
States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons 
why something should be done, that those who had been friendly to the adoption of this 
Constitution may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it that they 
were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a Republican Government, as those who charged 
them with wishing the adoption of this Constitution in order to lay the foundation of an 
aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every 
member of the community, any apprehensions that there are those among his countrymen 
who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. 
And if there are amendments desired of such a nature as will not injure the Constitution, and 
they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow-citizens, the 
friends of the Federal Government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for 
which they have hitherto been distinguished.17 
Instead of the words of a Framer determined to see the amendments passed because 
of a heartfelt belief in their necessity, Madison’s words appear as those of a seasoned 
                                                          
 11. Id. 
 12. Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 346–47 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
 13. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 150, 152 (2008). 
 14. Id. at 153. 
 15. See generally, Paul Finkleman, Turning Losers Into Winners: What Can We Learn, If Anything, From the 
Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849 (2001) (book review). 
 16. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424, 431–32 (1789)). 
 17. Id. at 94 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424, 431–32 (1789)). 
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politician seeking to successfully pass measures desired by his fellow countrymen, ones 
that “could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of good.”18 
Madison’s original language for the First Amendment Religion Clauses read, “The 
civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall 
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in 
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”19 These were not the words of a politician 
attempting to erect an impenetrable wall between Church and State. 
The first revision of the Clauses read, “No religion shall be established by law, nor 
shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.”20 Representative Peter Sylvester of New 
York particularly disliked this revised version because he feared it might serve “to abolish 
religion altogether,” and Roger Sherman vehemently objected to the inclusion of any such 
amendment referencing religious freedom.21 Inordinately dissatisfied with Madison’s 
proposed amendment, Representative Samuel Livermore sought to alter the language to 
read that “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of 
conscience[,]” while the Senate revised version read, “Congress shall make no law 
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion.”22 
These few glimpses into history and the Framers’ thoughts and actions support the 
view that they sought to avoid the establishment of a national religion and to prevent 
discrimination of citizens who were members of different religious sects than the state 
religions already established in nine of the eleven ratified states, as well as citizens 
possessing no religion.23 It is unjust to think that the recorded statements of ninety Framers 
could be summed up to conclude that they were erecting a wall of separation between the 
Church and the State. 
C. A History of God and Government 
The Founding Fathers of our nation and the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
enriched the annals of American History with illuminating commentary concerning their 
thoughts about the abiding and necessary presence of God in the governmental affairs of 
man. Further, “[t]he [same] Congress that passed the First Amendment also reenacted the 
Northwest Ordinance, which declared: ‘Religion, morality, and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and happiness of mankind, schools and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged.’”24 Note that this was five years prior to the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights.25 Founder, Framer, and President John Adams thought 
the exercise of genuine religious liberty called for the State to balance the establishment 
                                                          
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 94. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 97. 
 23. Id. at 98. 
 24. Matthew D. Fridy, Comment, What Wall? Government Neutrality and the Cleveland Voucher Program, 
31 CUMB. L. REV. 709, 720 (2001) (quoting Ordinance of the Northwest Territory art. III (1787)).  
 25. See an ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States, North-west of the river Ohio 
Art. III (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 340 (1937).  
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of one civil religion with the free exercise of many private ones and that every political 
system must establish some “form of public religion,” and some commonality of values 
and beliefs to provide a foundation of support for the “plurality of private religions.”26 
The thought that society and government could exist with all vestiges of religion 
eradicated was a foreign idea to these statesmen. It was with this heightened awareness 
that religion and morality were essential cornerstones in the foundation of good 
government that President George Washington included the following words in his 1796 
Farewell Address to the nation: 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are 
indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should 
labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of 
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to 
cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. 
Let it simply be asked: Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense 
of religious obligation deserts the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts 
of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained 
without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds 
of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality 
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.27 
At the outset of the New World’s birth, the immigrants who founded the Colonies 
brought with them a rich tradition of Christianity.28 This tradition was one so deeply 
entrenched in every aspect of their lives that only the most steadfast of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony Puritans could participate in the affairs of government.29 Historical knowledge of 
these spiritually devout environments, where public conciliations to religious beliefs were 
commonplace, led the Supreme Court to state that the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment were irrevocably grounded in the historical context of their adoption.30 
It was due to this staunch belief in the ability of strong religious morals and 
principles to maintain civic government’s operation at the “highest plane” that George 
Washington urged the appropriation of funds for the teaching of religion in Virginia.31 
Included by the authors of the First Charter of Virginia was the precept that the people 
founded the colony to serve “the Glory of his Divine Majesty.”32 The drafters believed 
that men of strong religion in service to God would function with the highest morals and 
                                                          
 26. Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Feb. 2, 1807), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR 408–09 
(William J. Bennett ed., 1997); See also Letter from John Adams to Zabdiel Adams (June 21, 1776), in 9 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 401 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1854) 
(“[I]t is religion and morality alone, which can establish the principles upon which freedom can securely stand. 
The only foundation of a free constitution is pure virtue.”). 
 27. George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796). 
 28. See generally MICHAEL CORBETT & JULIA MITCHELL CORBETT, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2014). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America’s Historical Experience with Church and State, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 475, 476 (2004) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429–30 (1962) and McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437–40 (1961)). 
 31. ANSON PHELPS STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 515 (1950). 
 32. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of 
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2186 (2003) [hereinafter “McConnell Establishment”]. 
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resist the temptation to fall prey to amoral vices, thus, guaranteeing society an existence 
in an orderly state of peace.33 
It is impossible to imagine a scenario where the Founders and Framers would have 
espoused the formation of a government for the new nation that was completely devoid of 
the presence of religion and where a wall existed that separated God from government. It 
is not possible, nor is it plausible to think this, and it is certainly not historically accurate. 
D. The Defective Use of a Metaphor in Everson v. Board of Education 
It is often said that “a new broom sweeps clean.”  In Everson v. Board of 
Education,34 the Supreme Court acted in a similar capacity when, with one sweeping 
motion, it ignored the intent of the Framers’ in drafting the Establishment Clause. 
Especially egregious was the Court’s misplaced dependence on Thomas Jefferson’s 
metaphorical “wall of separation between church and state” in the landmark decision to 
incorporate the Establishment Clause to apply to the states.35 Justice Black’s steadfast 
declaration provided the basis for the onset of misguided Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, the likes of which the Framers would not recognize,36 when he stated, “[i]n 
the words of Jefferson,” the First Amendment was intended to erect “a wall of separation 
between church and State” that must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve 
the slightest breach.”37 
Over the next sixty years, the invocation of Jefferson’s words in Everson opened the 
Court to an onslaught of cases with decisions that systematically attempt to remove every 
fiber of religious influence from the fabric of our nation’s governmental institutions.38 It 
is ironic that the Court in Everson paid homage to the words of Thomas Jefferson’s 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 2197. 
 34. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in 16 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281–82 (Albert Ellery Bergh & Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Association eds., 1904). 
 36. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
755, 755 (2001) (arguing that “[r]eligion has long been a part of our country’s fabric. The possibility of restraints 
on the development of this religious heritage was an early concern of our forefathers.”); McConnell 
Establishment, supra note 32, at 2207 (“[T]he history of the founding period shows that free exercise and 
disestablishment were supported politically by the same people, with the strongest support for disestablishment 
coming from the most evangelical denominations of Americans. How can this be squared with the conventional 
explanation?”). 
 37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
 38. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that a law is constitutional under the 
Establishment Clause if it 1) has a legitimate, secular purpose; 2) does not have the primary effect of either 
advancing or inhibiting religion; and 3) does not result in excessive entanglement of government and religion); 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (holding that displays of the Ten Commandments in public schools is 
unconstitutional); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985) (holding a school prayer statute to be 
unconstitutional because its purpose was to express the state’s endorsement of prayer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (holding that the teaching of Creationism in public schools violates the Establishment 
Clause); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding a Nativity scene placed in a grand 
staircase of a courthouse endorsed religion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding public school 
graduation prayer practices violate the Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 
290, 317 (2000) (holding high school prayer policies for football games violated the Establishment Clause); 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 858 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandment display was 
unconstitutional because it was not integrated in a display with a secular purpose). 
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interpretation of the Establishment Clause given that he neither participated in the debates 
of the First Amendment nor maintained a presence at the ratification debates of the State 
Legislatures.39 
Today, Jefferson’s figure of speech—written two days before he and most of the 
other U.S. Congressmen attended, without protest, a religious service held in the Hall of 
the House of Representatives—is the foundational stone of the separationist belief.40 In 
contrast to the intent of the Framer’s, the adherents to this belief continue to wage a judicial 
war, which seeks to achieve the removal of all religious influence on government, and the 
banishment of all religious practices from every vestige of public life.41 
In awarding such heavy weight to Jefferson’s ten words, “thus building a wall of 
separation between Church & State,”42 written ten years after the Bill of Rights was 
ratified, the Supreme Court has identified Jefferson as a champion of its slash-and-burn 
jurisprudence regarding the presence of religion in the public square.43 The Court relied 
on a misinterpreted metaphor to justify decisions that constructed new borders for the First 
Amendment, systematically limiting, or outright removing, the rights the Amendment was 
written to protect, and expanding the federal powers which it was written to limit. 
In its reliance on Jefferson’s wall as the foundation for assuming this role, the Court 
heavy-handedly disregarded Jefferson’s opposition to the federal regulation of religion 
expressed in his letter to Samuel Miller.44 In the letter, he explains his refusal to declare a 
national day of fasting and prayer: 
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from 
intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, disciplines, or exercises…this 
results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment or 
free exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves to the States the powers not 
delegated to the United States. Certainly no power to prescribe any religious exercise or to 
assume any authority in any religious discipline has been delegated to the General [Federal] 
Government. It must then rest with the States as far as it can be in any human authority.45 
However, Jefferson felt no such compunction against government prayer 
declarations while Governor of Virginia. In 1779, he forwarded to the Virginia House of 
Delegates a circular that all state executives received from the Continental Congress 
recommending a day of public thanksgiving.46 The Virginia House of Delegates then 
                                                          
 39. See generally 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 40. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-
1897, at 56 (1896). 
 41. Joe Wolverton II, J. D., The Establishment Clause, THE NEW AMERICAN (June 24, 2011), 
https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/7996-the-establishment-clause, (last visited Jan. 20, 
2018). 
 42. Supra note 12. 
 43. But see David E. Steinberg, Thomas Jefferson’s Establishment Clause Federalism, 40 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 277, 318 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s claims that Jefferson himself advocated a federally mandated 
separation of church and state are simply wrong. The Court’s misuse of Jefferson’s writings has been either ill-
informed and inaccurate, or an intentionally misleading creation intended to support the Court’s extension of its 
own power and authority.”). 
 44. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted in 11 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428–30 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See supra note 43 at 306. 
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composed a proclamation and sent it to Governor Jefferson who signed it into effect.47 
In Everson, the Court laid the foundation for gross judicial overreach when it cherry-
picked the Danbury metaphor from the writings and executive actions of Thomas 
Jefferson. By deciding to quote a letter containing such low hanging fruit and misapplying 
what was contained therein, the Court granted itself the authority to oversee all state 
legislation and regulation about the intermingling of religion and government. It has taken 
the Establishment Clause, which, according to Justice Clarence Thomas, “probably 
prohibits Congress from establishing a national religion[,]”48 and perverted it to justify the 
elimination of constitutionally sound legislation and policy. 
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS 
A. Lemon Test 
In 1971, the Burger Court heralded a new, bright-line rule for Establishment Clause 
cases.49 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, Pennsylvania adopted a statutory program providing 
financial support to parochial schools by reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, 
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.50 Similarly, Rhode 
Island adopted a statute in which the State directly paid a 15% supplement of an annual 
salary to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools.51 The Court found that each statute 
gave aid to church-related educational institutions and, therefore, was unconstitutional.52 
Writing for the majority, Justice Burger drew from the Court’s preceding 
Establishment Clause decisions (ruling for and against various claims) and formulated a 
three-part test for challenges to the Establishment Clause.53 To survive such a challenge, 
the Court opined that a statute “must have a secular legislative purpose;” its “principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and it “must not 
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”54 Thus, in one fell swoop 
the Court caused a sea change for Establishment Clause jurisprudence for years to come, 
and the Lemon Test became the leading method for challenges to the Establishment 
Clause.55 
                                                          
 47. GEN. ASSEMB., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF REVISERS, at 59–60 (Va. 1784). 
 48. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 49. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 50. Id. at 606–07. 
 51. Id. at 607. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 54. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 55. Since its inception, the Lemon Test caused division across the federal judiciary. Supreme Court Justices, 
judges, and scholars continue to criticize the vague test. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District, Justice Scalia expressed his disdain for the test and the majority’s reliance on it.  “Like some ghoul in a 
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and 
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school 
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.” 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Frank Easterbrook, 
characterized Lemon as hopelessly open-ended, lacking support in history or the text of the First Amendment, 
and “made up” by the Justices. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). First Amendment scholars have also criticized Lemon’s lack of textual foundation 
in the words of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Porth & George, The Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of 
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss1/5
HUNT, N-LET US PRAY-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  3:41 PM 
2018] LET US PRAY 59 
B. Historical Approach 
The Court heard Marsh v. Chambers a mere twelve years after the inception of its 
neutrality test.56 This case dealt with another Establishment Clause claim.57 In this case, 
the question posed was whether the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening each 
legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.58 Once again, the opinion came from Justice Burger.59 
Rather than using the test he contrived in Lemon, he disregarded the standard altogether 
and relied on history and the intent of the Founding Fathers.60 
The majority commented that, “[i]n light of the unambiguous and unbroken history 
of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative 
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society,”61 and that the people of 
the United States “are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.”62 With its ruling, the Court brought an exception for Establishment Clause 
challenges, one that looked to the deeply embedded history and tradition of an event or 
practice in this country.63 
C. Endorsement Test 
In 1984, the Lemon Test met more opposition when the Court’s newest justice 
proposed an alternative test.64 In Lynch v. Donnelly, citizens and local members of the 
American Civil Liberties Union sued the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, for displaying 
a crèche and Nativity scene in its annual Christmas display.65 Once again writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Berger found the display did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.66 He wrote that when the crèche was considered “in the context of the Christmas 
season,” the display did not violate any of the three prongs of Lemon67 and that the 
“primary effect” of the display did not benefit religion.68 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence proffered a clarification to the Establishment 
Clause doctrine69 by looking at the objective and subjective meanings of the message 
conveyed by the display.70 Justice O’Connor suggested that the Court examine 1) whether 
there was an “excessive [government] entanglement with religious institutions,” 71 and 2) 
                                                          
the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 129 (1987). 
 56. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 784. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 790–91. 
 61. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 62. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). 
 63. Id. at 786. 
 64. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 671. 
 66. Id. at 687. 
 67. Id. at 679–80. 
 68. Id. at 681–82. 
 69. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 687–95. 
 71. Id. at 687–88. 
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whether the government was endorsing or disapproving of religion.72 
In her concurrence, she reasoned that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”73 
Justice O’Connor suggested that endorsement brought forth the same conclusion as 
the majority and that the crèche should be interpreted as an acknowledgment of religion, 
but not an endorsement.74 After the birth of the Lemon Test, and within the next thirteen 
years, the Court proposed two more tests by which to examine the Establishment Clause. 
Members of the Court have found favor with the Endorsement Test,75 but like Lemon, it 
also brought criticism. 76 
D. The Two Coercions 
1. Psychological Coercion 
In 1992, the Court found itself creating another standard to evaluate Establishment 
Clause claims. This time, the opinion came from a younger member of the Court, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy.77 In Lee v. Weisman, the Court took up the issue of prayer conducted 
during graduation ceremonies.78 The principals of Providence, Rhode Island’s public-
school system were permitted to extend invitations to members of the clergy to offer the 
benediction.79 A father of one of the graduates objected to the prayers “to no avail.”80 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ruled that the prayers were coercive in 
nature, especially since children were the main audience, which violated the Establishment 
Clause.81 Looking to past precedent,82 he wrote “that prayer exercises in public schools 
carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”83 And in the context of school prayer, Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that the requests for a nonbeliever or dissenter to join in prayer may be 
seen as “an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious 
orthodoxy.”84 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 688. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691. 
 75. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 504 (2002). 
 76. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming the 
Endorsement Test “threatens to trivialize constitutional adjudication”); Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 
827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (suggesting the test “require[d] scrutiny more 
commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary”). 
 77. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 580. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 581. 
 81. Id. at 587. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”). 
 82. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963)). 
 83. Id. at 592. 
 84. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy also addressed the psychological pressures such acts could impose 
on children.85 He reasoned that while a student’s attendance to a graduation ceremony is 
not “required by official decree,”86 the student’s declination to attend because of the 
religious ceremony would constitute a “forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have 
motivated the student through youth and all her high school years.”87 The majority ruled 
that the prayer: 1) constituted government speech; 2) intruded and violated the objectors’ 
rights; 3) isolated the objectors; and 4) induced the objectors to conform to the practice.88 
Thus, the Court now looked to the “subtle coercive pressures”89 imposed by the 
government, and ruled the prayer violated the Establishment Clause.90 
2. Actual Legal Coercion 
Justice Scalia found little issue in criticizing the majority’s psychological coercion 
test, writing that it was “conspicuously bereft of any reference to history.”91 The criticism 
continued, as he found the test to be “boundless” and “boundlessly manipulable.”92 Justice 
Scalia found the rule bore no reflection of our nation’s historic practices, was socially 
charged, and brought to life by the “changeable philosophical predilections” of his 
colleagues.93 
Looking to the history and traditions of our country, Justice Scalia discussed the 
origins of the Establishment Clause and its original meaning when drafted by the 
Framers.94 He explained that at the time of the clause’s drafting, coercion reared its head 
in tandem with historical establishments of religion.95 At that time, the general public 
understood coercion to mean government compulsion by “force of law and threat of 
penalty.”96 Justice Scalia found the original meaning of coercion to be a far cry from the 
graduation prayer,97 and wholly disagreed with the historically unfounded psycho-
coercion test.98 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 593–94. (citing Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent–Peer Cross–Pressures, 28 AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 385 (June 1963); Clasen & Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in 
Adolescence, 14 J. OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE 451 (Dec.1985); Brown, Clasen, & Eicher, Perceptions of 
Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self–Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 521 (July 1986) (“Research in psychology supports the common assumption 
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is 
strongest in matters of social convention.”). 
 86. Id. at 595. 
 87. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595 (“Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success 
and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect. . . .”) 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 592. 
 90. Id. at 599. 
 91. Id. at 631. 
 92. Lee, 505 U.S. at 632. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 640–44. 
 95. Id. at 640. 
 96. Id. at 641. 
 97. Lee, 505 U.S. at 646. 
 98. Id. at 641; see also, Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal Inculcation, 
53 ST. LOUIS U.  L.J. 417, 483 (2009) (“As currently described, it is impossible to know whether the coercion 
test is very forgiving, very demanding, or somewhere in between. . . . [I]t is simply unconscionable for the Court 
13
Hunt: Let Us Pray: The Case for Legislator-Led Prayer
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018
HUNT, N-LET US PRAY-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  3:41 PM 
62 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:49 
IV. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Over the course of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
issue of legislative prayer arose two times, once in Marsh v. Chambers,99 and again in 
Town of Greece v. Galloway.100 The Court in Marsh ruled that chaplain-led prayer 
performed during the outset of sessions held by the Nebraska Legislature did not violate 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.101 But a footnote within the opinion 
provided ambiguity amongst the Court and lower courts as to the constitutionality of 
sectarian prayer.102 The Court addressed this issue in Town of Greece, abrogating 
Alleghany v. ACLU. This section undertakes an analysis of Alleghany, as well as Town of 
Greece, the Supreme Court’s most recent case on legislative prayer. 
A. County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Six years after the Court’s ruling in Marsh, it clarified the case based on a footnote. 
In 1989, the Court heard Allegheny, a case concerning two holiday displays located on 
public property in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.103 The first display was an eighteen-foot 
Chanukah menorah placed outside of the City-County building beside a Christmas tree, 
and the second display was a crèche depicting the Christian Nativity Scene.104 
While the case dealt with religious symbols, it had a lasting effect on legislative 
prayer cases. Attempting to quash Justice Kennedy’s concurring/dissenting opinions,105 
the majority delved into a discussion of Marsh through dicta.106 In this, the majority 
suggested that footnote fourteen of Marsh107 prevented the government from engaging in 
sectarian prayers.108 Prior to the Court’s decision in Town of Greece, Alleghany’s 
misinterpretation of a footnote led to lower courts splitting on the constitutionality of 
sectarian prayer.109 
                                                          
to offer such a confused and confusing jurisprudence.”). 
 99. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 100. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 101. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
 102. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
793 n.14 (1983) (opining that footnote fourteen of Marsh prevented the legitimacy of “practices that demonstrate 
government’s allegiance to particular sect or creed”)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 662, 664–65 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 603. 
 107. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793, n.14.) (“The legislative prayers 
involved in Marsh did not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had ‘removed all references to 
Christ.’”). 
 108. Id. at 603 n.52 (“Legislative prayer does not urge citizens to engage in religious practices, and on that 
basis could well be distinguishable from an exhortation from government to the people that they engage in 
religious conduct.”). 
 109. Compare Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that prayers 
invoking the name of Jesus Christ promoted Christianity over other religions, thus, violating the Establishment 
Clause) with Pelphrey v. Cobb Cty. 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]he ‘nonsectarian’ 
nature of the chaplain’s prayers [in Marsh] was one factor in this fact-intensive analysis; it did not form the basis 
for a bright-line rule”). 
14
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B. Town of Greece v. Galloway 
Since 1999, the citizens of Greece, New York, held town board meetings that began 
with an invocation by a local clergyman.110 After a roll call and recitation of the Pledge 
of Allegiance, the town supervisor invited a local clergyman to lead the meeting in a 
prayer.111 All prayer-givers were unpaid, and their selection process consisted of a town 
employee calling local religious institutions until she found a minister available for the 
month.112 The town neither excluded nor denied an opportunity to a prospective prayer-
giver, stating that “a minister or layperson of any persuasion, including an atheist, could 
give the invocation.”113 While this offer stood, all participating prayer-givers were 
Christian.114 
Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens attended these town meetings, listening to 
municipal developments and speaking about local issues.115 The two did not belong to the 
Christian faith, and at one meeting, “admonished board members that [they] found the 
prayers ‘offensive,’ ‘intolerable,’ and an affront to a ‘diverse community.’”116 In 2010, 
Galloway and Stephens sued the town in federal court for violating the Establishment 
Clause by preferring Christians over other prayer-givers and by sponsoring sectarian 
prayers.117 The plaintiffs requested an injunction, which would “limit the town to 
‘inclusive and ecumenical’ prayers that referred only to a ‘generic God’ and would not 
associate the government with any one faith or belief.”118 
Over the next sixty years, the invocation of Jefferson’s words in Everson opened the 
Court to an onslaught of cases with decisions the Court specifically addressed the 
constitutionality of sectarian prayer.119 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy opined 
that 1) legislative prayer extended to municipal board meetings; 2) the prayers conducted 
at the meetings did not have to be non-sectarian, abrogating Alleghany; and 3) the prayers 
did not coerce or compel the audience to participate in the religious observance.120 
Justice Kennedy first looked to Marsh, which demonstrated that legislative prayer 
comported with this nation’s history and the Founders’ original intent.121 He found no 
issues analogizing the town’s prayer practice to the legislative prayers in Marsh, writing 
that the practice had “historical precedent.”122 In addition, he turned his analysis to the 
                                                          
 110. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014). In years prior, the town meetings began with 
a moment of silence. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1817. 
 116. Id. The prayers in question invoked Christian themes and ended with phrases such as “in Jesus’ name.” 
Id. (citing 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203 (2010)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs did not wish to end the prayer practice in its entirety. 
 119. Id. at 1818. The district court ruled in the town’s favor, while the Second Circuit reversed the trial court’s 
decision. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 120. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1811. 
 121. Id. at 1819 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of 
the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.”). 
 122. Id. at 1819 (“In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no 
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”) 
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content of the prayers.123 Placing the Framers’ actions into historical context, Justice 
Kennedy found that an aberration from sectarian prayers did not accord with history.124 
In this, the Court abrogated Alleghany and established a rule in tune with history and a 
correct understanding of the decision in Marsh.125 
While finding sectarian prayer per se constitutional, the plurality observed that it 
still has constraints.126 The plurality called for prayers to be “solemn and respectful in 
tone,” inviting reflection by lawmakers on “shared ideals and common ends before they 
embark on the fractious business of governing.”127 To conclude this portion of the opinion, 
Justice Kennedy addressed the prayers that plaintiffs described as “disparage[ing] those 
who did not accept the town’s prayer practice.”128 He determined that while remarks 
“strayed from the rationale set out in Marsh,” they did not despoil the practice in its 
entirety, which reflected and embraced our tradition.129 The plurality opined that the 
prayers must “denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose” to 
constitute a constitutional violation.130 
Turning from the earlier line of analysis, the plurality addressed whether the prayers 
presented a coercive tone or message,131 and found that no acts by the town constituted 
coercion.132 Once again looking to historical practice, Justice Kennedy evaluated the 
prayers under a “reasonable observer” standard.133 He further expounded that the prayer 
practice showed no signs of denigration or exclusion, but a practice of inclusion.134 In 
sum, the plurality found the prayer practice to fall within the confines of the nation’s 
history and the rationale of Marsh.135 
                                                          
(citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). 
 123. Id. at 1820. 
 124. Id. (“An insistence on nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard is not consistent with 
the tradition of legislative prayer outlined in the Court’s cases . . . . The Congress that drafted the First 
Amendment would have been accustomed to invocations containing explicitly religious themes of the sort 
respondents find objectionable.”). 
 125. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1821–22 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S., at 794–95) (“[T]he Court instructed that 
the ‘content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,’ provided ‘there is no indication that the prayer opportunity 
has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.’”). 
 126. Id. at 1823. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1824. (Such prayers included: 1) characterizing prayer objectors as a ‘minority’ who are ‘ignorant 
of the history of our country; and 2) stating other towns did not have ‘God-fearing’ leaders). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Town of Greece, N.Y., 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
 131. Id. at 1825 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in 
part) (“[G]overnment may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.’”). See 
also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (plurality opinion) (opining that the nation’s “institutions 
must not press religious observances upon their citizens”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. Justice Kennedy reasoned that “the reasonable observer is acquainted with this tradition and 
understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion 
holds in the lives of many private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize or force truant 
constituents into the pews.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 1826. Typical prayers included phrases like “let us join our hearts and minds together in prayer”; 
“would you join me in a moment of prayer”; and “[t]hose who are willing may join me now in prayer.” Id. 
 135. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827–28 (“Ceremonial prayer is but a recognition that, since this Nation 
was founded and until the present day, many Americans deem that their own existence must be understood by 
precepts far beyond the authority of government to alter or define and that willing participation in civic affairs 
16
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1. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence: The Original Meaning of Coercion 
And from Town of Greece rode the horseman, Clarence Thomas, atop his noble 
steed, Originalism.136 Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment in 
Town of Greece.137 Part I of his concurrence reiterated that the Establishment Clause was 
a federalism provision, as evidenced by the “variety of church-state arrangements that 
existed at the Founding.”138 Part II discussed a narrower view of the coercion test, one 
steeped in history and the original meaning of coercion.139 
First heralded by Justice Scalia in Lee,140 Justice Thomas also argued that “the 
coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of 
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”141 
During the age of the Founding, coercive pressures from state establishments entailed 
mandatory attendance at an established church, levied taxes that generated church revenue, 
prevented dissenting ministers from preaching, and political participation exclusive to 
members of the established church.142 Thus, the original meaning of coercion, in 
applicability to the Establishment Clause, was “actual legal coercion,”143 not mere “subtle 
coercive pressures”144 as perceived by a “reasonable observer.”145 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas applied an originalist principle to the 
Establishment Clause. The conclusion was the same. Under this test, “[p]eer pressure, 
unpleasant as it may be, is not coercion.”146 But Justice Thomas’ rationale denotes a 
narrower test for Establishment Clause claims—one rooted in this nation’s history. 
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In the past year, federal Courts of Appeals rendered split decisions on the 
constitutionality of sectarian, legislator-led prayers.147 In the wake of Town of Greece (and 
                                                          
can be consistent with a brief acknowledgment of their belief in a higher power, always with due respect for 
those who adhere to other beliefs.”). 
 136. See Olivia Beavers, Senate Dem: ‘Gorsuch,’ ‘Thomas,’ and ‘Alito’ like Horseman of the Apocalypse, 
THE HILL (June 26, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/339522-senate-dem-gorsuch-thomas-
and-alito-like-horseman-of-the-apocalypse (U.S. Senator likens Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas to the 
‘horsemen of the apocalypse.’); See also David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 695, 727 (2009) (explaining how four justices of the Supreme Court were given the name the ‘Four 
Horsemen,’ due to their impeding actions against President Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms). 
 137. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1835–37 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. For the purposes of this paper, there is no need for further discussion of this section. Justice Thomas 
proffered his position on this subject at least two more times while on the Court. See generally Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 139. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1837–38. 
 140. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); See infra Part III D and accompanying text. 
 141. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J. dissenting). See also Perry, 545 U.S., at 693–94 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 729 (Thomas, J., concurring); Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (Thomas, J., writing for the 
Court). 
 142. Town of Greece, N.Y., 134 S.Ct. at 1838. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1819–20. 
 145. Id. at 1824–25 
 146. Id. at 1838 (quoting Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (opinion of Thomas, J.). 
 147. See Patrick L. Gregory, Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer Could Entice Supreme Court, Bloomberg 
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its tidal waves of ambiguity), both courts used the plurality opinion to its advantage. The 
Fourth Circuit struck down a prayer practice held during the outset of county board 
meetings as a violation of the Establishment Clause,148 while the Sixth Circuit held that a 
similar practice by a Michigan county board was consistent with the holding in Town of 
Greece and the original meaning of the Establishment Clause.149 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach 
In Rowan County, N.C., an elected body known as the Rowan County Board of 
Commissioners governs the County.150 The five-commissioner board meets twice a 
month.151 At the outset of each meeting, one of the five Commissioners leads the audience 
and fellow officials in prayer.152 The Commissioner ask the audience to join in prayer, 
usually with phrases like “Let us pray,” “Let’s pray together,” or “Please pray with me.”153 
Given that all members of the Board have been members of the Christian faith, the majority 
of the prayers were sectarian and Christian-based in content.154 
Three longtime residents of Rowan County sued the Board for violating the 
Establishment Clause.155 The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but on appeal, 
a Fourth Circuit panel reversed the ruling.156 In 2017, the Fourth Circuit reheard the case 
en banc and reversed the panel’s ruling.157 
In the rehearing’s majority opinion, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Board’s prayer 
violated the Establishment Clause for being sectarian, coercing the intended audience, and 
representing government sponsorship of religion.158 The court remarked that the present 
case and its progeny are fact-specific and “by their nature ‘matter[s] of degree.’”159 Under 
                                                          
Bureau of National Affairs (Sep. 13, 2017) (“The split could lead the Supreme Court to take up the issue of 
legislative prayer for a third time, though the court may let the issue ‘germinate a bit more to see what other 
circuits do.’”). 
 148. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 149. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 150. Lund, 863 F.3d at 272. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 272–73 (“Over the five-and-a-half years for which video recordings are available, 97% of the 
Board’s prayers mentioned “Jesus,” “Christ,” or the “Savior.”). 
 154. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 273. Several prayers confessed sin and asked for forgiveness on the community’s 
behalf: “Lord, we confess that we have not loved you with all our heart, and mind and strength, and that we have 
not loved one another as Christ loves us. We have also neglected to follow the guidance of your Holy Spirit, and 
have allowed sin to enter into our lives.” Id. Other prayers implied that Christianity was superior to other faiths: 
“[A]s we pick up the Cross, we will proclaim His name above all names, as the only way to eternal life.” Id. On 
occasion, Board members appeared to implore attendees to accept Christianity. “Father, I pray that all may be 
one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the world may believe 
that you sent Jesus to save us from our sins.” Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Lund, 837 F.3d at 411–31. 
 157. Lund, 863 F.3d at 268. 
 158. Id. at 281 (“We conclude that it is the combination of these elements—not any particular feature alone— 
that ‘threatens to blur the line between church and state to a degree unimaginable in Town of Greece.’”) (quoting 
Lund, 837 F.3d at 435 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting))). 
 159. Id. at 280. (“Establishment Clause questions are by their nature ‘matter[s] of degree,’ presupposing some 
acceptable practices and others that cross the line. . . . Prayers led by lawmakers, like sectarian prayers, may 
violate the Establishment Clause in some circumstances. And just as sectarian prayer has its limits, so, too, does 
legislator-led prayer.”). 
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this fact-sensitive inquiry, the court authored an opinion that veered from a specific inquiry 
into Marsh and Town of Greece to a haphazard evaluation of an array of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.160 
In stark disagreement with the plurality’s definition of coercion in Town of 
Greece,161 the Fourth Circuit concluded the Commissioners “press[ed] religious 
observances upon their citizens.”162 It included that the plaintiffs had “no trivial choice, 
involving, as it does, the pressures of civic life and the intimate precincts of the spirit.”163 
The court ended with the reiteration that this case was “one specific practice in one specific 
setting with one specific history and one specific confluence of circumstances.”164 It made 
a final point, noting that “legislator-led prayer can operate meaningfully within 
constitutional bounds.”165 
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit deterred from an analysis confined by history and 
coercion. Rather, its rationale drew a hardline distinction between legislative and 
legislator-led prayer by encompassing over forty years of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and tests. By doing this, the court drew back from Marsh’s legislative-prayer 
exception to Establishment Clause claims, rendering a ruling that gives little structure or 
guidance for similar cases within its circuit and fellow circuits. 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach 
In Bormuth v. County of Jackson, Jackson, MI County Board of Commissioners 
opened its public meetings with a prayer.166 Akin to other municipal practices across the 
nation, the Commissioners themselves offered the invocations on a rotating basis.167 After 
the meeting’s call to order, the Board’s Chairman usually requested Commissioners and 
the audience to “rise and assume a reverent position,” in preparation for the coming 
                                                          
 160. Id. at 275–86 (using a totality of the circumstances approach to analyze a myriad of Supreme Court cases 
and conducting its analysis by the likes of the Coercion and Lemon tests); See First Amendment—Establishment 
Clause—Fourth Circuit Holds That County Commissioners’ Practice of Offering Sectarian Prayers at Public 
Meetings Is Unconstitutional—Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), 131 HARV. L. REV. 626, 
632 (2017) (stating that the “lack of framework [in Lund] makes balancing competing implications opaque, 
difficult to replicate, and unpredictable”). 
 161. Justice Kennedy described the minister’s requests for the audience to join in prayer as an inclusive action, 
not coercion. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1811, 1826. While the court found no ground in paralleling the 
ministers’/chaplains’ requests in Town of Greece to the Commissioners requests (which were nearly identical), 
a closer inquiry reveals the comparison to be far from inapposite. See 863 F.3d at 307 (“Straightaway—and 
without any legal support for doing so—the majority attaches near-dispositive meaning to the fact that 
lawmakers, as opposed to clergy, gave the legislative prayers at issue in this case. Neither Marsh nor Town of 
Greece attached particular significance to the identity of the speakers.”). 
 162. Lund, 863 F.3d at 286 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005). 
 163. Id. at 288. The court explained that, “[d]ue to the Board’s requests, the plaintiffs also felt compelled to 
stand so that they would not stand out.” Id. at 288. Once again, the court veered from the plurality’s decision. 
Justice Kennedy explained that “offense does not equate to coercion.” Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1815. 
 164. Lund, 863 F.3d at 290. 
 165. Id.; but see id. at 296 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (stating that by ruling the prayer practice unconstitutional, 
“essentially because the prayers were sectarian, the majority opinion’s reasoning strikes at the very trunk of 
religion, seeking to outlaw most prayer given in governmental assemblies, even though such prayer has always 
been an important part of the fabric of our democracy and civic life”). 
 166. 870 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2017) 
 167. Id. at 498. 
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prayer.168 The Chairman’s requests varied, also including the following phrases: 
“Everyone please stand. Please bow your heads”; “Please bow your heads and let us pray”; 
and, “If everyone could stand and please take a reverent stance.”169 The prayers were 
usually Christian in nature and tone, often invoking the name of “God,” “Lord,” and “Jesus 
Christ.”170 
Peter Bormuth, a “self-professed Pagan and Animist,”171 sued the Michigan County 
for violations of First Amendment Establishment Clause by the Jackson County 
Commissioners.172 Bormuth based his claims on seven invocations, which he claimed 
were unconstitutional because they included sectarian references.173 
Upon rehearing of the appeal en banc, the Sixth Circuit found the actions of the 
commissioners themselves conducting prayer at town meetings, rather than a chaplain, did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.174 The majority found the en banc decision of the 
Fourth Circuit unpersuasive, thus, disregarded its holding.175 Writing for the majority, 
Judge Griffin opined that the invocations of the Jackson County Commissioners were 
consistent with the accepted standards for prayer practices in Marsh and Town of 
Greece.176 
In its ruling, the majority first addressed whether the prayers must be neutral in 
content, i.e., non-sectarian.177 Following the plurality’s ruling in Town of Greece, the 
majority ruled that the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer does not turn on the 
neutrality of its content.178 The court further opined that the county’s prayer practice fell 
within the confines of the nation’s history, as espoused in Marsh and Town of Greece,179 
which “[fell] within the religious idiom accepted by our Founders.”180 Finally, the 
majority looked to the issue of coercion.181 In its rationale, the majority found itself 
divided (much like the Supreme Court), regarding whether to use the ‘psychological 
                                                          
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498. 
 172. Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, No. 13-13726, 2015 WL 4477840, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015), report 
and recommendation adopted in part, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 173. Id. The seven prayers included phrases such as “in your holy name,” “bless our troops,” as well as names 
and words including “amen,” “heavenly father,” “lord,” and “Jesus.” 
 174. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498. 
 175. Id. at 547 n.5. (“We recognize our view regarding Jackson County’s invocation practice is in conflict 
with the Fourth Circuit’s recent en banc decision. However, for the reasons stated in the text of this opinion, and 
as more fully explained by the dissenting judges in Lund, we find the Fourth Circuit’s majority en banc opinion 
unpersuasive.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 176. Id. at 519. 
 177. Id. at 505. 
 178. Id. at 506. (“[O]nce the government has ‘invite[d] prayer into the public sphere,’ it ‘must permit a prayer 
giver to address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge 
considers to be nonsectarian.’”) (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1822-23 (2014)). 
 179. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (“Most significantly, history shows that legislator-led prayer is a long-standing 
tradition. Before the founding of our Republic, legislators offered prayers to commence legislative sessions.”). 
 180. Id. at 512. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the court found a long-standing tradition of legislator-led prayer, 
stating, “[b]efore the founding of our Republic, legislators offered prayers to commence legislative sessions,” 
and “[l]egislator-led prayer has persisted in various state capitals since at least 1849.” Id. at 509. 
 181. Id. at 515–16. 
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coercion test’ or the ‘actual legal coercion test.’182 Finding that Bormuth failed under both 
tests, the court opted out of “resolv[ing] [the] issue.”183 But, like Town of Greece, the 
majority found the Commissioner’s requests for the audience to “rise” and “remain quiet 
in a reverent position” fell far from the level of coercion.184 
With this decision, Bormuth created a split amongst the circuits regarding whether 
legislator-led prayer is per se constitutional. The confusion comes on many fronts. First, 
Town of Greece’s plurality left the lower courts in a haze of disarray. In doing so, two 
circuit courts divided on whether the historical tradition of legislative prayer by chaplains 
extends to legislator-led prayer. Second, the lower courts exacerbated the confusion in 
both cases, displaying fervent disagreement in the application of a ‘psychological’ or 
‘actual legal’ coercion test.185 If the Court does not address these issues and clarify Town 
of Greece’s ambiguity, legislator-led prayer will share the same fate as prior Court decided 
Establishment Clause activities, that is, it will exist in the murkiness of poorly rendered 
jurisprudence. 
VI. THE CASE FOR LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Evidence of turmoil amongst the federal judiciary is never more prevalent than on 
religious issues. One only need look to the lower courts to see the permeation of confusion. 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits added to the turbid mess through the split decisions 
regarding legislator-led prayer. In this section, I call for the Supreme Court to address the 
questions left unanswered from Town of Greece and bring coherence to its ambiguity. The 
Court can achieve this by adopting a hybrid assessment, looking to history and the original 
meaning of legislator-led prayer in accordance with the Establishment Clause. Like Marsh 
and Town of Greece, this assessment should start with a historical inquiry of legislator-led 
prayer. In line with the historical pretexts of this evaluation, my proposition also calls for 
an ‘actual legal coercion’ test when looking at the actions of the prayer-givers. Through 
this two-part assessment, the Court can evaluate prayer cases through a lens of historical 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 515–19. This division amongst the majority is rooted in a debate taking place in the Supreme Court. 
As exemplified in Town of Greece, the Court finds itself at odds as to which coercion test to use in Establishment 
Clause cases. In Town of Greece’s plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Kennedy 
advocated for a coercion test that “remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer 
arises and the audience to whom it is directed,” and “must be evaluated against the backdrop of historical 
practice.” Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (Kennedy, J.). In vehement disagreement, 
Justices Thomas and Scalia led the originalist charge for a test that conveyed the original meaning of religious 
coercion, which was “coercive state establishments” “by force of law or threat of penalty . . . .” Id. at 1837. 
 183. Id. at 516. 
 184. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517. 
 185. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d 494, 540 (6th Cir. 2017) (“I emphasize that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the 
controlling Town of Greece N.Y. opinion. A majority of this court appears to agree that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
controls.”); See also Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 297–99 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
But this argument goes far beyond the quarrelling and ideological differences between “conservative leaning” 
and “liberal leaning” judges. Judges in the Sixth Circuit, whom many would consider ideologically conservative, 
argue over the precedence of Justice Kennedy’s coercion test. Compare Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 n.9 (6th Cir. 2015) (Batchelder, J., concurring in part) (proffering that Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion “is controlling on the lower courts, as it is narrower than the accompanying two-
justice concurring opinion”) with Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 304 (6th Cir. 2017) (Griffin, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority opinion applies . . . Justice Kennedy’s opinion as if it were the opinion of the Court. 
It is not.”). 
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context and the original meaning of legislator-led prayer. 
A. The Hybrid Assessment of History and Coercion 
It is useful to remember that history is to the nation as memory is to the individual. As persons 
deprived of memory become disoriented and lost, not knowing where they have been and 
where they are going, so a nation denied a conception of the past will be disabled in dealing 
with its present and its future.   
- Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.186 
1. A Historical Guide to Legislator-Led Prayer 
Like Mr. Schlesinger, many Supreme Court Justices lamented these beliefs as they 
dissented to their colleagues’ capacious reading of the Establishment Clause.187 Since 
Everson, Justices, as well as many lower court judges, have called for a strict separation 
of Church and State. Based on this holding, the future of sectarian, legislator-led prayer is 
now at stake.188 If the Court looks to history, as it did in Marsh and Town of Greece, it 
will see that legislator-led prayer “comports with our [nation’s] tradition.”189 Based on the 
rationale of Marsh used in Town of Greece,190 history provides a constitutional analog 
between legislative prayer and legislator-led prayer. 
a. Federal Legislators 
As one Sixth Circuit judge noted in his dissent, there is “no doubt” that legislator-
led prayer finds root in the guidelines of the Establishment Clause.191 Members of 
Congress prove this historical trend when they, instead of the chaplain, invoke prayers.192 
Lawmakers often led their colleagues in prayer during some of the most gripping moments 
in the nation’s last half-century. Specific instances of these prayers include Senator John 
Danforth of Missouri leading the U.S. Senate in three prayers following the assassination 
attempt on President Reagan,193 and Senator Akaka leading his colleagues in prayer as 
they prepared for deliberations on “how the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton 
                                                          
 186. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, Folly’s Antidote, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/opinion/01schlesinger.html (last accessedvisited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 187. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is impossible to build 
sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the 
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.”). 
 188. See Lund, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Compare Kristopher L. Caudle, Unanswered Prayers: Lund v. 
Rowan County and the Permissiveness of Sectarian Prayer in Municipalities, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 625, 632 
(2014) (calling for an end to sectarian legislator-led prayer) with Amona Al-Refai, The End of Legislator-Led 
Prayers?, U. CIN. L. REV. (Oct. 2017), https://uclawreview.org/2017/10/25/the-end-of-legislator-led-prayers/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2018) (advocating for the Supreme Court to overturn the Fourth Circuit’s en banc ruling in 
Lund). 
 189. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014). 
 190. Id. at 1819 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of 
the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.”). 
 191. Bormuth v. Jackson Cty., 870 F.3d 494, 525 (6th Cir. 2017) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 192. Lund, 863 F.3d at 298 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 193. Brief of Members of Cong. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18–19, Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 
138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018), On Writ for Petition of Certiorari (2017) (No. 17-565), cert denied (hereinafter “Brief of 
Members, Rowan County”) (citing 129 Cong. Rec. 7630 (1983)). 
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should proceed.”194 Furthermore, solidifying these prayers in history is the 1853 Senate 
Judiciary Committee report, as Congress argued in its amicus brief in Bormuth, “the 
Establishment Clause was not ‘intend[ed] to prohibit a just expression of religious 
devotion by the legislators of the nation, even in their public character as legislators.’”195 
These are but a few examples of our nation’s lawmakers “ask[ing] their own God for 
blessings of peace, justice, and freedom that find appreciation among people of all 
faiths.”196 
b. State Legislators 
When looking at the practices of our State Legislatures, one can see “a majority of 
state and territorial legislators rely on lawmaker-led invocations.”197 This is proven by a 
survey conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”), which 
found at least “[forty-seven] chambers that allow people other than appointed or visiting 
chaplains to offer the opening prayer.”198 Some state legislative bodies, such as the Rhode 
Island Senate, permit only its members to deliver prayers before the deliberative body.199 
Like the federal government, state legislatures maintain a prayer practice the likes 
of which the Marsh Court would have upheld. The Court’s knowledge of the legislator-
led practice by the Nebraska Legislature in Marsh solidifies this to be fact.200 While Marsh 
dealt with chaplain-led prayers, the Nebraska “legislative journal shows that the Nebraska 
Unicameral also opened its sessions with member-led prayer.”201 The Marsh Court held 
                                                          
 194. Id. (citing 145 CONG. REC. 1408 (1999)). 
 195. Brief of Members of Cong. as Amici Curiae Supporting Jackson Cty. at 2, Bormuth v. Jackson Cty., 138 
S. Ct. 2708 (2018), cert denied (hereinafter “Brief of Members, Bormuth”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 32-376, at 4 
(1853)). 
 196. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014). 
 197. Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 289 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 198. Member of Congress made similar points in there brief. See Brief of Members, Rowan County, supra 
note 193, at 19; see also Brief of Members, Bormuth, supra note 195, at 4:  
At the state and local levels, member-led prayer is commonplace, and stretches back to the Founding 
. . . . the South Carolina Provincial Congress—South Carolina’s first independent legislature—
welcomed member-led prayer from before the signing of the Declaration of Independence. It 
requested “[t]hat the Reverend Mr. Turquand, a Member, be desired to celebrate divine service in 
Provincial Congress.” American Archives, Documents of the American Revolutionary Period 1774-
1776, at 1112 (1776); see also, e.g., Journal of the Provincial Congress of South Carolina, 1776, at 
35, 52, 75 (1776) (examples of “Divine Service” led by Rev. Turquand). Similarly, the annals of state 
constitutional conventions abound with examples of delegates (not chaplains) offering a prayer to 
begin deliberations. See, e.g., Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 5, 45, 53, 
63 (1912); 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates [Ohio] 100, 345, 358 (1873); Debates 
and Proceedings of the Convention [Arkansas] 44, 57, 68, 75, 77 (1868); 1 Debates and Proceedings 
of the Constitutional Convention [Illinois] 166 (1870); 2 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of 
the Convention [Indiana] 1141, 1294, 1311, 1431 (1850); 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and 
Debates [Utah] 59, 975 (1898). 
 199. Brief of Members, Bormuth, supra note 195, at 6. 
 200. Id. at 4–5 (“The Nebraska prayer practice at issue in (and approved by) Marsh encompassed member-led 
prayer.”). 
 201. Id. (citing 1 Legislative Journal of the State of Nebraska, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. 2087 (May 17, 1977), 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/85/PDF/Journal/r1journal.pdf; id. at v; 1 Legislative Journal of the 
State of Nebraska, 85th Leg., 2d Sess. 640 (Feb. 13, 1978), 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/85/PDF/Journal/r2journal.pdf). 
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that “most of the states” participated in a legislative prayer practice.202 The Court 
supported this claim by citing an NCSL survey, which included a notation stating that 
lawmakers often led prayer sessions before the deliberative body.203 Thus, while not 
explicitly stating it, the Court deemed a prayer practice constitutional that included 
legislator-led prayer. 
c. Prayers Invoked by Presidents 
From the floor of the U.S. Senate to the nation’s highest office, individuals seek to 
call upon a “Supreme Being”204 and “harmoniz[e] with religious canons.”205 While 
Presidential prayers are not completely analogous to legislator-led prayer, the acts by our 
Commanders-in-Chief give light to a practice “deeply embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country.”206 
Many of the Framers and Founders invoked prayers on the nation’s grandest stage. 
For example, George Washington’s inaugural address included this prayer: 
[I]t would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act my fervent supplications to 
that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who presides in the councils of nations, and 
whose providential aids can supply every human defect, that His benediction may consecrate 
to the liberties and happiness of the people of the United States a Government instituted by 
themselves for these essential purposes.207 
Washington offered another prayer during his 1789 Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamation. He began the invocation by stating, “it is the duty of all Nations to 
acknowledge the providence of Almighty God [and] to obey his will.”208 
From the same office, Presidents Madison and Jefferson offered similar prayers. 
President Jefferson prayed in his inaugural address, “may that Infinite Power which rules 
the destinies of the universe lead our councils to what is best, and give them a favorable 
issue for your peace and prosperity.”209 Mimicking the rhetoric of his fellow presidents 
and founders with his inaugural address, President Madison called upon the “guidance of 
that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have 
                                                          
 202. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–89 & n.11 (1983) (citing Brief of National Conference 
of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) as Amicus Curiae)). 
 203. Id. (“The survey . . . explained that the ‘opening legislative prayer’ in various states may be given by 
various individuals, including ‘chaplains, guest clergymen, legislators, and legislative staff members.’”). The 
NCSL brief further outlined that “[a]ll bodies, including those with regular chaplains, honor requests from 
individual legislators either to give the opening prayer or to invite a constituent minister to conduct the 
prayer.”Id. 
 204. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J.) (“[We] are ‘a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.’ We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.”). 
 205. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“The Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it 
“harmonizes with religious canons.”). 
 206. Marsh, 463 U.S at 786. 
 207. J. CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 208. George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 386, 386–
87 (William J. Bennett ed., 1997). 
 209. J. CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (1989). 
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been so conspicuously dispensed to this rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to 
address our devout gratitude for the past, as well as our fervent supplications and best 
hopes for the future.”210 
In present day, President Donald Trump continues the pattern of his predecessors in 
invoking a Higher Power. During the 2017 Christmas Ceremony, President Trump offered 
to the American people the meaning of Christmas: 
For Christians, we remember the story of Jesus, Mary and Joseph that began more than 2,000 
years ago. As the book of Isaiah tells us, for to us a child is born, to us a son is given and the 
government will be on his shoulders and he will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty 
God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. This good news is the greatest Christmas gift of 
all, the reason for our joy and the true source of our hope.211 
As Justice Scalia declared in Lee, “The history and tradition of our Nation are replete 
with public ceremonies featuring prayers.”212 Through these examples, it is evident that 
legislator-led prayer is a practice that is in accord with “unambiguous and unbroken history 
of more than 200 years.”213 
B. Actual Legal Coercion and Legislator-Led Prayer214 
“[W]hat interferes with religious liberty, is an establishment of religion.”215 James 
Madison solidified this fact, stating “Congress should not establish a religion and enforce 
the legal observation of it by law.”216 When undergoing analysis of the Establishment 
Clause, the Court explicitly held that it “must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical 
practices and understandings.’”217 Thus, when evaluating the constitutionality of 
legislator-led prayer, the Court should adopt a test that is congruent with the original 
meaning of the establishment of a religion and employ an actual legal coercion test.218 
                                                          
 210. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 447, n.3 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 211. Lauren Gill, Trump Christmas Message: What Does the President’s Book of Isaiah Passage Mean?, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 25, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-christmas-message-what-does-presidents-book-
isaiah-passage-mean-758633. 
 212. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633 (1992) at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 213. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
 214. For the purpose of this analysis, I do not address the current debate regarding the precedential authority 
that Justice Thomas’s concurrence may have on lower courts. Instead, I call for the Court to adopt the actual 
legal coercion test. See Bormuth, 849 F.3d at 304 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The dissent explains that in Marks 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”). 
 215. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 
941 (1986). 
 216. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 21 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2d ed. 1994). 
 217. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). (citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. at 670) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 218. See James A. Campbell, Note, Newdow Calls for A New Day in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: 
Justice Thomas’s “Actual Legal Coercion” Standard Provides the Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 
541, 591 (2006) (concluding that “Justice Thomas’s actual legal coercion test provides a preferable alternative 
to Establishment Clause analysis. O’Connor’s ceremonial deism approach adds an additional test to an already 
perplexing area of constitutional law.”); Ralph W. Johnson III, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law 
Too—the Direct Coercion Test Is the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. 
REV. 123, 194 (1993) (“The “direct coercion” test appropriately focuses attention on the governmental 
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1. The Original Meaning of the Establishment of Religion and its Interplay with 
Coercion 
a. Establishment of Religion 
Many Supreme Court Justices and scholars portray an establishment of religion “to 
mean the promotion of any kind of religion or religious activity.”219 Yet, that interpretation 
does not stand well against historical precedent.220 The historical record reflects that 
establishment “denotes any special connection with the state . . . possessed by one 
religious society to the exclusion of others; in a word, establishment is of the nature of a 
monopoly.”221 Former Supreme Court nominee and U.S. Senator, George E. Badger, 
succinctly described the original understanding of an “establishment of religion” in his 
Senate Judiciary Committee report regarding the Senate’s Chaplaincy Program. He wrote: 
The clause speaks of “an establishment of religion.” What is meant by that 
expression? It referred, without doubt, to that establishment which existed in the mother-
country . . . endowment at the public expense . . . or disadvantages or penalties upon those 
who should reject its doctrines or belong to other communions—such law would be a “law 
respecting an establishment of religion . . .” 222 
Constitutional scholar and former Circuit Judge, Michael McConnell, explained that 
the hallmark elements of establishment included: 1) governmental control over the 
doctrines, structure, and personnel of the state church;223 2) mandatory attendance at 
religious worship services in the state church;224 3) public financial support;225 4) 
prohibition of religious worship in other dominations;226 5) use of the state church for civil 
functions;227 and 6) limitation of political participation to members of the state church.228 
Thus, a review of the Framers’ original understanding of “an establishment of religion” 
indicates they concerned themselves with the possibility of government controlling 
religion, “which is arguably the most salient aspect of the historical establishment,”229 
                                                          
indoctrination and compulsion, which is, in fact, the true standard of an establishment of religion.”). 
 219. William F. Cox, Jr., The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and its Application to Education, 
REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 128 (2001); see, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[The] 
Court’s precedent permits even the slightest public recognition of religion to constitute an establishment of 
religion.”). 
 220. See Cox, supra note 219, at 128-34; See, e.g. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 51 (2005) (“[W]hen people referred to an ‘establishment of 
religion,’ they generally referred either to a single state church or to some other mechanism whereby one 
denomination or group of denominations was favored over others.”). 
 221. Cox, supra note 219, at 130 (quoting 9 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, 
SCIENCES, LITERATURE, AND GENERAL INFORMATION 787 (11th ed. 1910)); see also id. (“Similarly, use of the 
word ‘establishment’ during the Founding Era referred to ‘the “establishing”’ by law’ a church, religion, or form 
of worship and ‘the conferring on a particular religious body the position of a state church.’”). 
 222. AMERICA’S GOD AND COUNTRY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 168 (William J. Federer ed., 1996). 
 223. McConnell Establishment, supra note 32, at 2131–44. 
 224. Id. at 2144–46 
 225. Id. at 2146–59. 
 226. Id. at 2159–69. 
 227. Id. at 2169–76. 
 228. McConnell Establishment, supra note 32, at 2176–81. 
 229. Id. at 2207. 
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rather than removing religion from the public sphere.230 
b. Coercion and Establishment 
At the time of the Framing, the Founders strived to combat the State’s compulsion 
and coercive decrees regarding religion. Professor Michael McConnell notes, “the 
problems that the Founders had encountered were that the government had sought to 
compel adherence to one religion or, in some colonies, one of several religions, and that 
the government had sought to restrain adherence to the others.”231 Justice Scalia re-
affirmed these facts in his Lee dissent, stating, “The coercion that was a hallmark of 
historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial 
support by force of law and threat of penalty.”232 
Throughout the Court’s lengthy jurisprudential roller coaster with the Establishment 
Clause, many Justices looked to Founder James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessment for clarity on the original understanding of the Religion 
Clauses.233 Professor McConnell points out that Madison’s work reflects the fact that 
compulsion/coercion go hand-in-hand with establishment:234 
What does the Memorial and Remonstrance have to say about compulsion and 
establishment? It states: (1) that the proposed bill for the support of teachers of the Christian 
religion would be a “dangerous abuse” if “armed with the sanctions of a law”; (2) that 
religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence”; (3) that 
government should not be able to “force a citizen to contribute” even so much as three pence 
to the support of a church; (4) that such a government would be able to “force him to conform 
to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever”; (5) that “compulsive support” of religion 
is “unnecessary and unwarrantable”; and (6) that “attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, 
acts obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general.” 
Again, legal compulsion to support or participate in religious activities would seem to be the 
essence of an establishment.235 
He further notes that it is “difficult to see” how there could be a state establishment 
without some element of coercion.236 
In sum, the historical record reflects the Framers’ original understanding of an 
                                                          
 230. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would prefer 
. . . adopting an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices, 
and that can be consistently applied-the central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional 
in a State’s favoring religion generally.”). 
 231. McConnell Coercion, supra note 215, at 939. 
 232. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 233. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 at 37 (“[The Memorial and 
Remonstrance] is Madison’s complete, though not his only, interpretation of religious liberty. It is a broadside 
attack upon all forms of ‘establishment’ of religion, both general and particular, nondiscriminatory or selective.”) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting); see, e.g., John T. Valauri, Justice Rutledge’s Appendix, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 91, 91-92 
(2010) (“Justice Rutledge appended Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments to 
his Everson dissent, making the Remonstrance the central historical document in the subsequent debate on the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause.”). 
 234. McConnell Coercion, supra note 215, at 938. 
 235. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 236. Id. 
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establishment of religion to “necessarily [involve] actual legal coercion.”237 Through 
actual legal coercion, “the government only violates the Constitution when it uses legal 
means to directly coerce religious beliefs.”238 An establishment of religion “entails 
coercion,”239 and failure by the Court to summarily parallel the two infringes upon 
religious freedom. 
2. Clarity for Legislator-Led Prayer 
The courts in Bormuth and Lund caused a jurisprudential ‘split’ regarding sectarian, 
legislator-led prayer.240 As previously argued, these conflicting rulings stem from the 
ambiguities left by Town of Greece. If the Court adopts Justice Thomas’s actual legal 
coercion model for evaluating legislator-led prayer, it will 1) put to rest the subtle 
difficulties of the psycho-coercion test by replacing it with a historically accurate 
evaluation; and 2) give guidance to the lower courts when evaluating legislator-led prayer 
cases. 
a. Actual Legal Coercion Brings Uniformity to the Courts 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits raised several issues arising from legislator-led prayer 
cases. The court in Bormuth found no issue analogizing legislator-led prayer to legislative 
prayer,241 while the Fourth Circuit in Lund expounded that the elected representatives 
giving such prayers “threaten[ed] to blur the line between church and state to a degree 
unimaginable in Town of Greece.”242 With this, the lower courts are in disarray on key 
issues arising in legislator-led prayer inquiries. By using the actual legal coercion model, 
the courts can affirm a “long-standing tradition”243 in America, and bar practices the 
original meaning of the Establishment Clause intended to prevent. 
First, Judge Sutton’s concurrence in Bormuth posed the important question “[How 
would] a pattern of legislator-led prayer with respect to one faith coerce citizens to follow 
that faith in a way that chaplain-led prayer of a single faith does not?”244 He also wrote 
                                                          
 237. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301 at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1236 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Though not yet adopted by a majority opinion from the 
Supreme Court, a test focusing on actual legal coercion, rather than endorsement, appears the most faithful to the 
original meaning of the Establishment Clause.”); Johnson, supra note 218 at 179 (“[Adopting a legal coercion] 
standard would mark a return to the original purposes of the Establishment Clause.”); William A. Glaser, 
Worshiping Separation: Worship in Limited Public Forums and the Establishment Clause, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 
1053, 1064 (2011) (“[T]he coercion test forms an important element of modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”). 
 238. Campbell, supra note 218, at 569. 
 239. Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 869 (Easterbrook, F, dissenting) (7th Cir. 2005). 
 240. See David. L. Hudson, Jr., Circuit Split on Constitutionality of Legislator-led Prayer May Lead to 
SCOTUS Review, Am. Bar Ass’n J. (Feb. 2018) 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/circuit_split_on_legislator_led_prayer/. 
 241. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (“In our view and consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition, prayers by 
agents (like in Marsh and Town of Greece N.Y.) are not constitutionally different from prayers offered by 
principals.”); see id. (citing Am. Humanist Association v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 2017) (“It would 
be nonsensical to permit legislative prayers but bar the legislative officers for whom they are being primarily 
recited from participating in the prayers in any way.”). 
 242. Lund, 863 F.3d at 281. 
 243. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509. 
 244. Id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring); see also id. at 521. Judge Sutton included a list of the common prayerful 
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that the religious message would seem to “grow[], rather than diminish[],” when the 
government employs a chaplain to lead in prayers.245 Like Judge Sutton, and the rest of 
the majority in Bormuth, Judge Agee and Judge Niemeyer shared these views in Lund.246 
These judges find the identity of the prayer giver constitutionally irrelevant.247 
But the majority in Lund and the dissenting judges in Bormuth disagreed. Judge 
Wilkinson, writing for the Lund majority, wrote that the Rowan County Board “stepped 
over the line”248 by allowing solely the board members to conduct the prayer sessions and, 
in turn, “press[ed] religious observances upon their citizens.”249 Likewise, author of the 
lead dissent in Bormuth, Judge Moore, opined that “coercion is compounded by the setting 
in which it is exerted . . . [and] there is increased pressure on Jackson County residents to 
follow the Board of Commissioners’ instructions at these meetings, as the residents would 
not want to offend the local government officials they are petitioning.”250 
Like legislative prayer, legislator-led prayer requires a “fact-sensitive” inquiry.251 
However, rather than using Justice Kennedy’s approach, which looks to “social 
pressures,”252 “subtle coercive pressures,”253 and speculates impact, the Court should 
adopt a simpler rule that “faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.”254 
The actual legal coercion test is a simple, “liberty-focused inquiry.”255 It holds true to the 
original meaning of the Establishment Clause, which is that an establishment of religion 
“interferes with religious liberty.”256 When using this test to evaluate legislator-led 
prayers, judges will weigh liberty against compulsion and constraint.257 
Instead of looking to how the “‘reasonable observer’ feels ‘subtle pressure,’ or 
perceives governmental ‘endors[ement],’”258 actual legal coercion looks to the direct 
                                                          
elements. (“Let us pray.” Or “Let me pray.” “Please join me in prayer.” Or “Please join me, if you wish, in 
prayer.” “Please stand reverently as we pray.” Or “Please stand reverently, if you wish, as we pray.” “Council 
member Smith will now offer a prayer.” Or “Our chaplain will now offer a prayer.” “We pray these things in 
Jesus’s name.” Or “We pray these things in God’s name.” “We pray these things in God’s name” while making 
the sign of the cross. Or “We pray these things in God’s name” without making the sign of the cross. In telling 
Congress and eventually the States that they “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” the 
First Amendment does not preference any of these options. (emphasis added)). 
 245. Id. at 523; see also id. (“Just as we would not mistake a legislator’s reference to his or her faith during a 
floor debate as an establishment of religion, we should not make that mistake when they invoke their personal 
faith as part of an invocation.”). 
 246. Lund, 863 F.3d at 299 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s pro forma distinction of Town of Greece 
can only be driven by its desire to reach a different end, because the nature of Rowan County’s prayer practice 
is, in all aspects of plaintiffs’ complaints, virtually indistinguishable from the practice upheld [in Town of 
Greece.]”); Id. at 301 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“The only new feature in this case is the identity of the prayer giver. 
But—for the reasons explained below—that single characteristic does not remove the Board’s practice from the 
protected scope of Marsh and Town of Greece.”). 
 247. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (“[N]either Marsh nor Town of Greece restricts who may give prayers.”). 
 248. Lund, 863 F.3d at 286. 
 249. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 250. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 541 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 251. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 252. Id. at 1820. 
 253. Id. 
 254. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 255. Johnson, supra note 218, at 192. 
 256. McConnell Coercion, supra note 215, at 941. 
 257. Johnson, supra note 218 at 192. 
 258. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1838 (2014). (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations 
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actions of the government. As applied to the context of Bormuth and Lund, the test allows 
both county boards to continue their prayer practice. As Judge Easterbrook noted, speech 
is not inherently coercive because “the listener may do as he likes.”259 Thus, the “subtle 
coercive pressures”260 the prayer practices may have caused do not equate to the actual 
legal coercion by government establishment that the Framers sought to prevent. When a 
government leader stands before his constituents and colleagues, asking them to “Please 
Rise” or invoking the name of “Jesus Christ,” they are not preferring one religion over 
another nor coercing their audience to partake in a state establishment by the force of law 
or threat of penalty.261 
b. Actual Legal Coercion: A Simple Alternative to the Psycho-Coercion Test 
The Court should discard Justice Kennedy’s “psycho-coercion” test. His plurality 
opinion in Town of Greece was contradictory, and his coercion test was inapposite to his 
historical analysis. Kennedy discussed an the “tradition” of our nation and offers an 
evaluation steeped in history,262 but he ultimately supplanted this analysis with his own 
‘psycho-coercion’ test,263 which is a far cry from the historical meaning and record of the 
Establishment Clause.264 “[T]he primary concern for those who framed the Establishment 
Clause was the potential imposition of a single religion by the Federal government via 
coercive force.”265 By employing an actual legal coercion test, the Court can apply a test 
that is “relatively easi[er] to apply,” unlike Justice Kennedy’s test,266 and provide one, 
simple test for the lower courts that “focuses attention on governmental indoctrination and 
compulsion.”267 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For nearly seventy years, the Justices of the Supreme Court battled to define the 
Establishment Clause’s confines on government. Whether it be through a plethora of tests 
or two roads diverging in historical clarity, the Court finds itself at an impasse. Over the 
years, many Justices addressed the Establishment Clause with little recourse to, or regard 
for, our nation’s historical record.268 As written by Justice Douglas, “We are a religious 
                                                          
omitted). 
 259. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d at 132 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 260. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1820. 
 261. But See Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cty., 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 530 (W.D. Va. 2015) This is the only legislator-
led prayer case on record showing the government coercing its audience. Rather than letting dissenters to town 
board prayers sit in disagreement, the board members instructed them to either rise and participate or leave the 
meeting. 
 262. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct., at 1819–22. 
 263. Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 264. See id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts 
backed by threat of penalty—a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us who have 
made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.”); see also supra Part II.A and 
accompanying text. 
 265. Johnson, supra note 218, at 183. 
 266. Glaser, supra note 237, at 1064. 
 267. Johnson, supra note 218, at 194. 
 268. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833) (“The 
real object of the [First] Amendment was . . . to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should 
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people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to 
worship as one chooses.”269 For more than sixty years, a metaphor not present in the U.S. 
Constitution, and likely never uttered during the Constitutional debates, dictates our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.270 
Legislator-led prayer invokes a tradition intricately embedded in the fabric of this 
nation. The federal circuits divide on issues regarding these prayers, thus, causing 
conflicting precedent across the nation. If the Court does not address the resulting 
ambiguities left regarding legislator-led prayer from its Town of Greece opinion, “similar 
cases will continue to have [more] incongruous outcomes throughout the country.”271 
Through the two-part analysis offered in this paper, the Court can address legislator-led 
prayer through a historically accurate inquiry. This test would “provide certainty for the 
thousands of state and local governments that have long allowed lawmaker-led prayer in 
their proceedings—and thereby continue a tradition that ‘has become part of the fabric of 
our society.’”272 
 
                                                          
give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.”); School Dist. of Abington Township 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he line we must draw between the 
permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of 
the Founding Fathers.”). 
 269. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J.) 
 270. But see N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (“[A] page of history is worth a volume of 
logic[.]”). 
 271. Brief of American Center for Legal Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 7, Rowan Cty., N.C. 
v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (No. 17-565) cert denied. 
 272. Brief of West Virginia and 20 Other States et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 29–30, Rowan 
Cty., N.C. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (No. 17-565), cert denied. 
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